"But we have MFA." It's the most common thing people say after a Microsoft 365 mailbox gets taken over, and it's usually true. The staff member typed their password into what looked like the Microsoft sign-in page, approved the prompt on their phone, and saw their inbox. Everything worked. The attacker was sitting in the middle the whole time.
This is adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing, and it's the reason "turn on MFA" is no longer the end of the conversation. Text message codes, authenticator app codes and push approvals all make it harder to steal an account. None of them stop this particular trick.
What does stop it is a newer kind of sign-in, and it's more practical to roll out than most people expect.
How it works
A normal phishing page is a copy of the Microsoft sign-in page that just collects passwords. An AiTM page is different: it's a relay. It sits between your staff member and the real Microsoft service, passing everything back and forth in real time.
- The person enters their email and password. The relay forwards them to Microsoft.
- Microsoft asks for MFA. The relay shows that prompt to the person, and they complete it.
- Microsoft signs them in and issues a session cookie, the thing that means you don't have to sign in on every page. The relay keeps a copy.
- The attacker loads that cookie into their own browser and is now signed in as your staff member, with MFA already satisfied.
Microsoft described this at scale back in July 2022: a campaign that had targeted more than 10,000 organisations since September 2021, built on the open-source Evilginx2 toolkit, which then moved into invoice and payment fraud from the stolen mailboxes. Our article on business email compromise and invoice fraud picks up that part of the story.
Since then it has become a rental service. The best known kit, Tycoon2FA, appeared in August 2023. Microsoft describes it as one of the most widespread phishing-as-a-service platforms, sold for as little as US$120 for ten days, with lures that often used PDF, SVG, HTML or Word attachments carrying QR codes. In early March 2026 Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, with Europol and industry partners, disrupted Tycoon2FA's infrastructure. Microsoft reported that its email volume fell 15% over the rest of that month, and that the operators had partly recovered by moving to new hosting. Disruption helps. It doesn't end the technique, and other kits fill the gap.
Are you affected?
If your staff sign in to Microsoft 365 with a password plus a text code, an app code or a push approval, then yes, this attack works against you.
Signs it may have happened to someone:
- A sign-in from an unfamiliar location or internet provider shortly after a normal sign-in by the same person.
- New inbox rules that move, delete or forward mail, especially anything mentioning invoices or payments.
- Replies to conversations the person doesn't remember, or suppliers asking about "updated bank details".
- Defender or Entra ID Protection alerts about risky sign-ins or suspicious session activity.
How to fix it
The fix is to use sign-in methods that a relay can't pass through. These are called phishing-resistant MFA. They check the real address of the site you're signing in to, so a lookalike domain simply gets nothing useful.
- Move people to phishing-resistant methods. In Microsoft 365 that means passkeys (including passkeys stored in the Microsoft Authenticator app), FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, or certificate-based authentication. The ACSC recommends phishing-resistant MFA for online services and warns that weaker methods, such as SMS codes, are more exposed to this kind of relay.
- Start with admins, then finance and executives. In Conditional Access, use the built-in "Phishing-resistant MFA" authentication strength for admin roles first. Then extend it to the people who approve payments, then everyone.
- Require a managed device. A Conditional Access policy that requires a compliant (Intune-managed) or Entra hybrid joined device means a stolen cookie replayed from the attacker's own laptop fails the check. Microsoft has recommended this since its 2022 research. It covers a lot of ground on its own, and it's often quicker to deploy than passkeys for everyone.
- Turn on Token Protection where it fits. Token Protection binds sign-in tokens to the device they were issued to. Be clear about its limits: as of September 2026 it's generally available for desktop and mobile apps accessing Exchange Online, SharePoint Online and Teams, while support for browser sessions is still in preview and limited to selected web apps that access Azure Resource Manager. AiTM mostly steals browser sessions, so treat Token Protection as a useful extra, not the main fix.
- Keep the email and browser layers on. Safe Links, Safe Attachments and zero-hour auto purge in Defender for Office 365, plus SmartScreen in Edge, catch plenty of these pages before anyone types anything.
Expect some effort. Passkeys need a short enrolment for each person, and a few older apps or shared accounts will need attention. That's a good trade for closing the most common way Microsoft 365 accounts are taken over today.
Device code phishing is a related trick that also gets past ordinary MFA. We cover it in device code phishing in Microsoft 365.
If you think it already happened
A password reset on its own is not enough. Microsoft notes that Tycoon2FA let attackers keep access after a password reset unless the person's sessions and tokens were revoked as well.
- Revoke the person's sessions in Entra (open the user and select Revoke sessions), and reset their password.
- Review their MFA methods and remove anything added recently that they don't recognise.
- Delete suspicious inbox rules and forwarding.
- Reverse any payroll or bank detail changes, and warn finance and any suppliers who received mail from the account.
- When they re-enrol, set them up with a phishing-resistant method.
Report it to ASD's ACSC at cyber.gov.au (opens in a new tab) ("Cybercrime" for most businesses, "Cyber security incident" for organisations with 250 or more staff, government and critical infrastructure) or call the Australian Cyber Security Hotline on 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371). If personal information in the mailbox was likely accessed, check whether the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme applies.
Where Geidi fits
Our cyber security services are aligned to the Essential Eight and backed by a 24/7 security operations centre. If you'd like to talk about moving your team to phishing-resistant sign-in, talk to us.
Sources
- Microsoft Security Blog: From cookie theft to BEC: attackers use AiTM phishing sites as entry point to further financial fraud (12 July 2022) (opens in a new tab)
- Microsoft Security Blog: Inside Tycoon2FA: how a leading AiTM phishing kit operated at scale (4 March 2026) (opens in a new tab)
- Microsoft Security Blog: Email threat landscape, Q1 2026 trends and insights (30 April 2026) (opens in a new tab)
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access authentication strengths (opens in a new tab)
- Microsoft Learn: Token Protection in Microsoft Entra Conditional Access (opens in a new tab)
- Microsoft Learn: Revoke user access in Microsoft Entra ID (opens in a new tab)
- ASD's ACSC: Implementing multi-factor authentication (opens in a new tab)




